We study data-driven assistants that provide congestion forecasts to users of shared facilities (roads, cafeterias, etc.), to support coordination between them, and increase efficiency of such collective systems. Key questions are:
INTRODUCTION
Data-driven interventions on social and economic systems are on the rise, but it remains a challenge to understand when and how they can improve such systems in terms of peoples' actual utilities. Here we consider central predictive coordination assistants, that, in the simplest case, work as follows: The assistant provides a congestion forecast A to users of some facility, based on past observations. The users trust A to be a good forecast, and individually optimize their facility use based on it, e.g., their arrival time slot, to coordinate and avoid crowds. Thereby they generate an observable outcome Y , which A is a forecast for. In particular, forecast A influences outcome Y . Versions of such assistants exist for roads, trains, swimming pools, etc. [Google, 2019 , ASFA, 2019 , DB, 2019 , or, in our experiment, a cafeteria, see Figure 1 .
Main goals and contributions: We aim at (1) understanding to what extent optimally accurate assistant predictions can help coordination between users (Goal 1), and (2) designing sequential assistant algorithms that achieve optimal predictions (Goal 2). Our contributions:
• Introducing new concepts for this setting, we analyze when the assistant achieving a "perfect" (probabilistic) prediction A of Y , i.e., a "self-fulfilling prophecy", is equivalent to "solving" coordination in the sense of selecting a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) (Theorem 1).
• We establish conditions under which such a prophecy exists even in large-scale settings with only populationlevel aggregated user data (Theorem 2), using the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem. This entails a new nonatomic game BNE existence result (Corollary 3).
• We propose learning assistant Algorithms 1 and 2 (controllers), for large-/small-scale settings, with optimality/convergence guarantees (Propositions 1 and 2).
• We report positive evaluation of Algorithm 1 in a large-scale real-world cafeteria experiment (Section 6).
Overview over closest related research: Within game theory, dynamics/equilibria of agents are studied that learn about each other by repeatedly interacting, but without central assistant [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] . Besides this, the following game-theoretic work usually assumes that agents reason fully rationally based on their own a priori given beliefs about other agents, instead of using a predictive assistant informed by past behavioral data: Congestion games [Nisan et al., 2007] formalize coordination in certain shared facilities. (Allocation) mechanisms are designed [Nisan et al., 2007] that maximize social welfare (which is defined in terms of agent's a priori unknown preferences), in spite of agents being self-interested, by using incentives. Unlike our assistant, these mechanisms often fully control the outcome. And we consider "solving coordination" in game-theoretic (equilibrium selection) rather than in social welfare terms. Beyond game theory, certain smart cities research [Mareček et al., 2015] uses a controltheoretic approach for congested facilities, but they fix an objective that does not in general account for users' individual, a priori unknown preferences. For further related work, see Section 7, and Section B in [Geiger et al., 2019] (the extended version of this paper).
PRELIMINARIES AND SETTING
For a variable Z, range Z denotes the (implicitly given) range.
General setting and assistant-based system
Let us first introduce the general users' decision problem. We leave it fairly abstract so that later on we can consider different forms of decision making scenarios based on it.
Setting 1 (General (one-stage) setting). There is a finite set K = {0, . . . , |K| − 1} of slots 1 , and a set I, interpreted as users (here and in Section 3.2) or types of users (in Section 3.3), respectively. Each user i ∈ I:
• receives a (private) signal W i ,
• as (private) action B i chooses a slot in K, and
• experiences (private) utility U i he wants to maximize.
Let W = (W i ) i∈I , B = (B i ) i∈I and U = (U i ) i∈I . Be-1 K can be e.g., several facilities, or time slots in one facility. sides the private signals, there is a publicly available signal V , and some underlying (latent) state X. And there is a publicly observable outcome Y =Ȳ (X, B), for some functionȲ . 2 We assume there is a "true" distribution P (X, V, W ). If not stated otherwise, we assume that all users i are inference-assistable, i.e.,
And let all users i be assistant-separable, i.e., h i (Y ) ⊥ ⊥ W i |V (for any possible mechanism that generates B from V, W ). 4
Setting 1 leaves open how users reason/decide. Our main object of study is a system that enriches this setting: user i chooses B i that maximizes her expected utility, given Y is distributed according to a central assistant's forecast: Definition 1 (Assistant-based system M ). Based on Setting 1, or any restricted version, let the assistant-based (one-stage) system M be defined by the following objects and assumptions additional to Setting 1, as depicted by the (causal) Bayes net [Pearl, 2000] in Figure 2 : There is an assistant that takes public signal V as input and outputs A, a probabilistic forecast for the public outcome Y , based on policy π, i.e., A = π(V ). That is, A is a distribution over Y (later we also consider point forecasts).
User i ∈ I takes forecast A (besides her private signal W i ) as input, and acts assistant-best-respondingly, i.e.,
is induced by all the above (measurable) equations and P (X, V, W ). We may write P M,π and E M,π to make the dependence on π explicit. Y is observed, but the specific P (X, V, W ) andŨ i 's are a priori unknown, and X, W, B and utilities U are unobserved by the assistant.
Game-theoretic tools to characterize efficiency
We want to analyze the degree of efficiency that assistant-based coordination can achieve. For this, we now define what a "solution" of the coordination problem would be (a BNE), accounting for users' preferences. This is based on an idealized, assistant-free version of Setting 1 (a Bayesian game), where users i have informed priors and unlimited inference abilities themselves, using W i and V as input. Then, for any user behavior that arises in the assistant-based system, we can check if it is (or rather: corresponds to) such a solution.
For background on game theory and the Bayesian game definition we use, see Section A in [Geiger et al., 2019] . Definition 2 (Benchmark (assistant-free) game G).
Based on Setting 1, or any restriction of it, let the benchmark game G be defined as the Bayesian game canonically associated to this setting: Each user i ∈ I is a player who has: signal (W i , V ) ∈ range (Wi,V ) , (measurable) utility function range (X,Wi,B) → R given by Eq. 1, and action B i ∈ K. The utility functions are common knowledge and P (X, V, W ) is the common prior.
As usual, a (pure) strategy profile for G is a tuple s = (s i ) i∈I of (measurable, pure) strategies s i :
for (almost) all i, w i , v; with U i as in Eq. 1, and E G,(bi,s−i) the expectation under P G,(bi,s−i) (X, . . . , U ) obtained by "plugging" strategy profile (b i , s −i ) into game G (b i here means the constant strategy). 6 We call the BNE strict if the argmax is unique.
To relate M to G, given an assistant policy π of the assistant-based system M , we define the corresponding strategy profile s π by the composition of π and users' subsequent (deterministic) "best-response" action, i.e.,
(4) 5 I.e., the strategy si maps player i's signal to her action 6 I.e., each player's strategy is a best response to the others.
Conversely, given a strategy profile s of the benchmark game G, we define the corresponding assistant policy 7 π s (v) := P G,s (Y |v), for all v.
(5)
Objective functions
We consider the following two objective functions for the assistant's policy π, where, as we will see, the former can be seen as a directly measurable "proxy" to the latter:
• (probabilistic) prediction accuracy objective (loss):
with d(·, ·) some arbitrary but fixed statistical distance which is 0 iff both distributions coincide;
• equilibrium selection objective 8 : π is optimal iff the corresponding strategy profile s π (Eq. 4) is a BNE of the benchmark game G.
We call a policy π that tries to optimize L pred π loosely a (predictive coordination) assistant, and a π that achieves L pred π = 0 a (formally) self-fulfilling prophecy (policy).
THE UTILITY OF PREDICTIONS FOR COORDINATION -ANALYSIS
In this section, we pursue the following goal, for which the one-stage setting we introduced in Section 2 is sufficient (we will introduce a repeated version in Section 4).
Goal 1. Understand the conditions when, and the degree to which, assistants, that achieve π ∈ arg max π L pred π , help solve the problem of coordination between users of facilities (here: in terms of equilibrium selection).
Characterization step in general setting
Theorem 1 (Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Characterization). We have, in the general setting (Setting 1, with all users being inference-assistable and assistant-separable):
• If the assistant policy π in the assistant-based system M (where all users are assistant-best-responding) is a self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e., L pred π = 0), then the corresponding strategy profile s π is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the benchmark game G.
• Conversely, if the strategy profile s is a strict BNE of the benchmark game G, then the corresponding assistant policy π s is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The proof is in Section D.1 in [Geiger et al., 2019] . Since in Section 2 we were very brief regarding some of the (measurability) assumptions and definitions underlying the theorem, we give a detailed elaboration of these assumptions and definitions, and their soundness, in Section C in [Geiger et al., 2019] . For a justification of some of the theorem's assumptions see Section 7. Note that Setting 1 is formulated pretty generally: the slots K can be any set of options the users have. K can be time slots in one shared facility, like a road section; or K can be several facilities that provide the same service, say civil offices in a city; or it can be a combination, i.e., time slots in several facilities. (Our "slot" is similar to "facility", or, to some extent, "feasible combination of facilities", in congestion games.) The main limitation may be seen in the assumptions of inference-assistability and assistant-best-responding, saying that users can meaningfully evaluate the utility of their choices based on only Y , which A is a forecast for.
Existence step in small-scale setting
In Theorem 1, we characterized the type of solution (a BNE of game G) that is implemented by the assistantbased system (with significantly lower requirements on users' knowledge/inference capacities than in the game G), if the assistant reaches a self-fulfilling prophecy policy ("characterization step"). We established this result for the general setting (Setting 1). As second step towards Goal 1, it remains to understand when such a selffulfilling prophecy exists ("existence step"). This second step we perform separately for two instructive subsettings of the general setting, which are each still reasonably general. As a warm-up exercise, we start in a setting where we can easily build on game-theoretic results -because it corresponds to a classical finite Bayesian game.
Introducing the setting
Setting 2 (Small-scale setting). As a restricted form of Setting 1, consider the following small-scale setting: I = {1, . . . , n} is finite and we interpret its elements here as users (not types), and the individual actions of the users are directly publicly observable, i.e., Y = B, and h i (B) = B −i in Eq. 1. X, V, W all have finite range.
We may write M small and G small to denote assistant-based system (Definition 1) and benchmark game (Definition 2), respectively, canonically associated to this particular small-scale setting.
Corollary 1. Setting 2 is a special case of Setting 1. In particular, it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and hence the theorem's implications hold for M = M small and G = G small .
Self-fulfilling prophecy existence
To understand the conditions under which a self-fulfilling prophecy exists, based on the second part of Theorem 1 (or rather: Corollary 1) it is enough to understand when a strict BNE of G exists. But in the current small-scale setting, G = G small is the classical finite (Bayesian) game, which is well understood. For example, Harsanyi [1973, Theorems 3, 4] showed that when assuming that the players' utilities are contaminated by a small additive noise, then there exists a strict equilibrium with probability one. Furthermore, Bilancini and Boncinelli [2016] establish conditions under which all BNE are (essentially) strict, which entails existence of such strict BNE when combined with general BNE existence results.
Existence step in large-scale setting
While the above small-scale setting is easy to understand, it has significant limitations: first, the users' actions B have to be fully observable for the (loss L pred of the) assistant, which is often impossible due to data privacy regulations; and second, there has to be a fixed set of unique users, while in practice the set of users may change of course. Therefore we perform the second step towards Goal 1 also for the following large-scale setting (again a subsetting of the general setting of Section 2, different from the small-scale setting). It corresponds to nonatomic games [Schmeidler, 1973] , and is mathematically more involved, but abstracts away from individual users and in particular only requires a cross-user aggregate of actions to be publicly observed.
Introducing the setting
Setting 3 (Large-scale setting). As a restricted form of Setting 1, consider the following (aggregated) large-scale setting:
• For simplicity, we assume there are only two slots, K = {0, 1}, and that V, W are constant. 9 We assume I = [0, 1] with the Borel sets as σ-algebra I, and interpret i ∈ I as a type of user with a certain form of utility function and private signal (similar as Kim and Yannelis [1997] ). Let range B (i.e., the set of possible joint user actions (B i ) ∈I ) be the set of {0, 1}-valued Lebesguemeasurable functions on I.
• Let range Y1 = [0, 1] and Y 1 := B i r(i|X)di, for (r(·|x)) x∈range X a family of continuous (Lebesgue) densities on (I, I), continuous also in x. And let Y 0 := 1 − Y 1 . The interpretation is that Y 1 is the fraction of users that choose slot 1, i.e., a (stochastic) aggregate of B, and Y 0 is the remaining amount of users, that choose slot 0. Since Y = (Y 0 , Y 1 ) is fully parameterized by Y 1 , from now on we consider Y to be 1-dimensional and stand for Y 1 .
• Regarding users i ∈ I and utilities, let h i (Eq. 1) be the identity, and let (i, y) →Ũ i (k, y) be a polynomial in i, y, for all k ∈ K (we dropped W i , h i from the general U i , Eq. 1). This means, in particular, that the utilities only depend on the amount of users at the various slots, not on their identities. For any k = l ∈ K, letŨ i (k, y) − U i (l, y) = m i m q m (y) be such that, for at least one m ≥ 1, q m (y) is nonzero and constant in y.
Note that, while in practice of course the set of (simultaneous) users and thus also (simultaneous) types of users is finite, having I = [0, 1] can be seen as an approximation with nice theoretical properties to real settings with many users. We may write M large and G large to denote assistant-based system (Definition 1) and benchmark game (Definition 2), respectively, for this particular large-scale setting. 10 G large can be seen as an incomplete-information nonatomic game, related to [Kim and Yannelis, 1997] but different in that our state can have uncountable range, see also Section B in [Geiger et al., 2019] . 11 For the sake of completeness, let us formally state a version of Theorem 1 for this setting, proved in Section D.2 in [Geiger et al., 2019] . Corollary 2. Setting 3 is a special case of Setting 1. In particular, it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 and hence the theorem's implications hold for M = M large and G = G large .
Self-fulfilling prophecy existence
In contrast to the small-scale setting, for the large-scale setting and the corresponding benchmark game G large there is less established work that helps to understand existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy policy. Intuitively, a key question in this large-scale setting is: can a forecast that only forecasts an aggregate of the users' actions (the Y of Setting 3) actually be a self-fulfilling prophecy and thus help for coordination? For instance, as observed by Mareček et al. [2016] , if the population of users is completely homogeneous, they will all respond in the same way upon receiving the same input, making coordination difficult.
Here is our answer for this question -the second of our two main theoretical results. 10 In the assistant-based system M large , let range A be the set of Borel measures on [0, 1], since A is a probabilistic forecast for Y (= Y1). 11 The distribution over the types (which is not to be interpreted as a probability -rather as one actual realization) is random, turning it into an incomplete-information setting. The name "nonatomic" comes from the fact that one considers nonatomic measures on the type space I = [0, 1].
Theorem 2 (Large-Scale Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Existence). There exists a self-fulfilling prophecy policy π in the assistant-based system M large (in Setting 3).
This implies, based on Corollary 2:
Corollary 3 (Large-Scale Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence). The benchmark game G large (for Setting 3) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
Proof idea and interpretation: The proof of Theorem 2, which is given in Section D.3 in [Geiger et al., 2019] for an arbitrary number of slots K, is based on the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem, harnessing the compactness of the set of Borel measures, range A , under a weak topology. The most important implication of the theorem is that min π L pred π = 0. And therefore, together with the first step in the form of Theorem 1, it shows that an assistant that only forecasts an aggregate can nonetheless, when it achieves its optimum, help "solve" the coordination problem -select a BNE. The intuition behind the assumptions is that types and their utility functions have to be diverse. Corollary 3 can be seen as standalone, purely game-theoretic result for G large .
An instructive linear special case
Let us consider a simple special case of the large-scale setting (which is not central to understand the rest of the paper and can be skipped). On the one hand, this helps to get an intuition for Theorem 2, on the other hand this will justify assumptions we will make in the analysis of our algorithm in Section 5.1. Assume the utilityŨ i (k, y) of Setting 3 is linear in i, y for all k ∈ K (making the users "risk-neutral"). SoŨ i (1, y) −Ũ i (0, y) = i + ϕy + χ, for ϕ, χ ∈ R. Let r(i|x) := 1 2δ [x−δ ≤ i ≤ x+δ], i ∈ I, x ∈ range X , with [·] the Iverson bracket (i.e., density of the uniform on [x − δ, x + δ]), and let P X be the uniform on [δ, 1 − δ]. Then the value of Y as a function of A = a, X = x is, for H the Heaviside function, given by
First, this shows that under the mentioned assumptions, Y (and its distribution) only depends on the mean E Y ∼a (Y ), but no other properties of a. In particular, L pred π = 0 iff L point π = 0, for π an appropriate probabilis-tic extension of π , and
a point prediction version of the probabilistic prediction accuracy loss L pred π . 12 This justifies for the assistant to provide point forecasts under the above assumptions. Second, this justifies a (locally) linear model for Y in (E Y ∼a (Y ), x) and noise. Note that Theorem 2 restricted to this simple linear case is immediate based on the intuitive fact that a generic linear function has a fixed point.
SETTING FOR ALGORITHM PART -CONTROL DYNAMICS
To prepare the algorithm part of the paper, let us extend the general one-stage setting (Setting 1) and the assistantbased one-stage system (Definition 1) to a general dynamic setting and an assistant-based dynamic system M dyn , respectively, in the following "natural" way. This directly implies also dynamic extensions of small-scale and large-scale setting (Settings 2 and 3) and the corresponding assistant-based systems (we do not introduce explicit symbols for them though).
The dynamic extensions consists of N copies of the onestage versions, called stages/repetitions. We denote variables, say A, in the t-th repetition by A t , t ∈ N. Furthermore, the dynamic extensions contains the following equations that replace/extend the ones of repetition tthink of it as a form of feedback control model, a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [Sutton and Barto, 1998 ] (from the perspective of the assistant):
with E t independent stochastic error terms, (measurable) functionX, and (measurable) dynamic assistant policy π. 13 The gray, dashed arrows of Figure 2 indicates this dynamic extension. Regarding the assistant's objectives, let L t,pred , L t,point be defined similarly as L pred , L point , but additionally conditioning on the observed past: 12 The reason why we take this definition of L point π instead of, say, some form of "E((A t − Y t ) 2 |V )", is because the (distribution of) Y depends on A. And it may happen that the latter quantity, which is some form of "variance" that depends on the distribution of Y , is lower for a non-fixed point A than for a fixed point A, which would hurt the relation to equilibrium selection. A similar reason underlies our definition of L pred π . 13 A 0:t−1 means A 0 , . . . , A t−1 ; similarly for other variables. for all π, and similarly L t,point π . Remember: stage t must not be confused with (time) slot k within one stage. To motivate the algorithmic part below, let us give two examples of naive dynamic assistant policies that fail.
Example 1 (Naive assistant yields oscillation). Consider a toy scenario of two users, i = 1, 2, two slots, K = {0, 1}, W, V, X constant, and (0, 1) and (1, 0) the (pure) Nash equilibria of the induced completeinformation benchmark game. For simplicity, let B be directly observed (Y = B) , let A be a point forecast. As usual, assume each day t both users best-respond to A t . The assistant starts with, say, A 0 = (0, 0) and then, naively, each day takes yesterday's outcome B t−1 as forecast for today, A t . It is easy to see that this will lead to an overshooting and oscillating system B 0 = (1, 1) , B 1 = (0, 0), B 2 = (1, 1) , . . . (called flapping by Mareček et al. [2015] ).
Example 2 ("I.i.d." assistant is sub-optimal). Classical forecasting applied to the sequence B 1 , B 2 , ... from Example 1 would yield the empirical distribution P (B = b) = 1 2 (δ (0,0),b + δ (1,1),b ), with δ the Dirac delta, as optimal probabilistic forecast A t -under some stationarity assumption. But the actual best forecast would be a Dirac delta on one of the two Nash equilibria (0, 1) and (1, 0) (Theorem 1; we ignore mixed equilibria here).
PREDICTIVE ASSISTANT ALGORITHMS WITH GUARANTEES
In the first part, we analyzed conditions under which predictive assistants help coordination (in terms of the equilibrium selection objective, Section 2.3), if they manage to optimize prediction accuracy, leaving open the "how". Therefore, as second part of the paper, we address:
Goal 2. Design algorithms for the assistant policy π in the dynamic assistant-based system M dyn that optimize prediction accuracy L t,pred (and asymptotically select an equilibrium, if possible), learning from past interactions.
We will consider dynamic versions of the two settings for which we established in Section 3 that predictions can help coordination: large-scale setting (in Section 5.1) and small-scale setting (in Section 5.2). For each setting, we propose an assistant algorithm π, and provide a theoretical analysis of its dynamics/convergence. A unifying idea behind both algorithms is that they mitigate certain bad user behavior, e.g., "overshooting" due to too many users jumping to the same purportedly "good" slot, helping convergence to a Nash equilibrium (of the stage benchmark game). Recall that users' utilities (functions) are hidden from the assistant (Definition 1), so the assistant's inference (about the equilibrium) is mainly based on behavioral data of how users react to forecasts.
Algorithm 1: Expodamp (large-scale setting)
1 Input: parameter: α 2 for each stage t ≥ 1 do 3 Input:
Expodamp for large-scale setting
Consider the dynamic large-scale setting 14 (Section 4) and let A be a point forecast for Y , i.e., range A = range Y , and consider L t,point π as loss (dynamic version of Eq. 10, as described in Section 4). Recall that in Section 3.3.3 we gave conditions that justify this point prediction approach.
We propose Expodamp as described in Algorithm 1 as the assistant's dynamic policy π. The intuition behind Expodamp is that this formula can dampen oscillations due to "overshooting" user behavior (Example 1) but it can also accommodate for non-stationarities in user preferences. These intuitions will be made rigorous in the proposition below. 15 Assumption 1. Let the following equations hold for the dynamic assistant-based system M dyn , t ≥ 1:
with E t X , E t Y noise terms that are independent of the past and each other. (This is a state-space model known from the Kalman filter [Lütkepohl, 2006] .)
Recall that in Section 3.3.3 we gave conditions, in the large-scale setting, that justify the linearity in Assumption 1 (note that the X in Assumption 1 would correspond to a parameter of the distribution of X rather than to X itself in Section 3.3.3, but we neglect this detail for simplicity of notation). Also note that Assumption 1 is a linear approximation which facilitates the theoretical analysis but comes at the cost of a mismatch to the actual setting: (Y t ) t∈N in Assumption 1 can leave [0, 1] in the long run, so the model should rather be seen as a local approximation. Note that, due to convexity, Expodamp will always output A t ∈ [0, 1] upon Y t−j ∈ [0, 1], j ≥ 1 though. Keep in mind that the fixed point (self-fulfilling prophecy) of the linear function a → βa + γx (ignoring 14 In particular, Y is considered 1-dimensional (since Y1 determines Y0). The extension to more slots is straight forward. 15 The formula in Algorithm 1 is a case of a so-called exponential smoothing method [Hyndman et al., 2008] . However, so far (to the best of our knowledge) it has only been applied to classical forecasts that do not influence the outcome. In a sense, we generalize the established method to this new setting. the noise term) is γ(1 − β) −1 x (exists whenever β = 1). In particular, if β = (1 − γ), then the fixed point (corresponding to the self-fulfilling prophecy/BNE) is x. We can give the following guarantees, for which we prove a generalization 16 in Section E.1 in [Geiger et al., 2019] .
Proposition 1 (Optimality and Convergence Rate of Expodamp). In the dynamic large-scale setting (Section 4), let Assumption 1 hold true. Let the assistant's policy π be Expodamp (Algorithm 1).
• Stochastic case: In Expodamp, let α := (1 − β) −1 for the true β of Eq. 15. Assume E t Y = 0, t ≥ 1. Then, at each stage t, L t,point = 0 and
That is, Y t converges exponentially with rate γα towards the "optimum"/fixed point x (and thus also A t converges to x based on Expodamp's formula) if 0 < γα < 2.
When applying Algorithm 1 in practice, often one does not know the parameter α a priori and has to infer it. As a first approximation, it may be learned by naively fitting Algorithm 1 to past observational data as if it were a classical (non-influential) forecasting method [Hyndman et al., 2008] . In principle however, without going into detail, α rather has to be learned like a control policy, based on how the environment responds to it.
Partpred for small-scale setting
While Expodamp is the main algorithm of this paper, here we also provide a proof-of-concept algorithm for the repeated small-scale setting (Section 4). Assume X t to be independent of X 1:t−1 , i.e., the special case where the X t , t ∈ N are i.i.d. The algorithm, Partpred, is sketched -for the case that V is constant -in Algorithm 2, and fully described in Section E.2 in [Geiger et al., 2019] .
The basic idea is as follows: as long as there is (significant) uncertainty about where the optimum (selffulfilling prophecy/BNE) would be, the algorithm tries to make a prediction that is at least partially correct (i.e., makes the correct prediction at least w.r.t. the behavior of one player). The algorithm combines ideas from bestresponse dynamics and congestion games [Roughgarden, 2016] with random exploration whenever the bestresponse dynamics would cycle. LetĀ be the (finite) 16 It is formulated slightly cleaner, using the do-operator. Keep outputting a forever 9 else if a has been tried r times then 10 Pick unused a ∈Ā at random 11 Set a = a and jump to line 2 set of all distributions P G,s (B) that arise from (deterministic) strategy profiles s of G small . For simplicity, we assumeĀ to be given, but in a next step this could be inferred as well. We give the following guarantee, sketched for V constant, whose general version is proved in Section E.2 in [Geiger et al., 2019] . Proposition 2 (Convergence of Algorithm 2 (Sketch)). In the setting described above, assume G small has a strict BNE. Let the assistant's policies π r , r ∈ N be given by Algorithm 2, with parameterĀ as defined above. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists R, T such that for all r > R, t > T , it holds that P (L t,pred πr = 0) > 1 − ε and P (s πr is a BNE of G small ) > 1 − ε.
EXPERIMENT
Here we empirically evaluate Expodamp (Algorithm 1 for the large-scale setting) and a baseline.
Experimental setup: We conducted our experiment in a real-world congested campus cafeteria with around 400 users per day. Here, observation [Y t ] k is (a proxy to) the number of people in the queue at time k of day t. 17 The coordination assistant in this experiment is a web app which provides the daily forecast (i.e., the forecast is updated once per day, in the morning -more dynamic versions are future work) to the cafeteria users, to inform their decisions in terms of when to go to the cafeteria. The web app is used by between 15 and 45 users per day but may influence more (slightly deviating from our model). Besides Expodamp (with parameter α tuned 17 While our general considerations allow Y to be queue length, in our large-scale setting the components of Y are the slots, of which queue length is rather something like an integral. Figure 3 for an illustration of the experimental protocol. As metric, we use the mean squared error 18
The outcome is in Table 1 , showing that Expodamp outperforms Average in this experiment. For illustration, we also show a sample of Expodamp's output A t and actual outcome Y t , for one day t, in Figure 1 .
REMARKS AND FURTHER RELATED WORK
This section discusses additional aspects of the main results and further related work.
Why prediction accuracy / equilibrium selection as objective. Alternative to our approach in this paper, one could start from some (somehow legitimized) social welfare [Nisan et al., 2007] as a function of users' preferences, and design assistants that try to optimize it. This would be somewhat more in line with the economic notion of optimizing efficiency. Here, we rather follow a heuristic approach of starting with the "natural" prediction accuracy objective, because it compares well to the benchmark of equilibrium selection (Theorem 1), and for the following reasons: First, prediction accuracy can be directly measured, while social welfare seems hard to infer/identify from the incomplete information contained in the behavioral data available in our setting. Second, it is easy to interpret for users and leads to a form of "incentive compatibility" of users' assistant-best-response (see remark below). Third, we feel that in our coordinative setting, equilibrium outcomes can be quite efficient in terms of social welfare. Generally, social welfare functions of course are hard to pick and impose in the first place. Nonetheless, equilibrium outcomes can of course be significantly inefficient, which has extensively been studied under the name of price of anarchy [Roughgarden, 2005 , Nisan et al., 2007 . But even in this regard, Theorem 1 can be helpful in that it makes predictive assistant-based settings amenable to such studies.
Remarks on our model assumptions:
To justify our assumption of users "blindly" best-responding to the assistant's forecast (Definition 1) observe that it can be seen as consistent with (instrumental) rationality 19 in the following sense: if only considering the asymptotic utility (once the assistant converged), then deviating from this behavior means deviating from a BNE, based on Theorem 1. 20 Furthermore, all users best-responding simultaneously can sometimes be a too strong assumption, but we feel that it is a situation that can happen (more or less) at least sometimes, and therefore is worth analyzing. This being said, the assistant-best-responding assumption should be seen as a pragmatic first step that can be refined in future work. Generally, Theorem 1 shows that assistant-based systems can achieve coordination comparable to the benchmark game (additionally, it serves as a mechanism for equilibrium selection if there are several) -but at a significantly lower cost, since the inference task is centrally done by the assistant. (Obviously, it is only cheaper when inference comes at a cost -otherwise raw data V could simply be provided to users directly.)
Further general related work: Let us mention that for the various versions of assistants we mentioned in Sec-tion 1 that are publicly available [Google, 2019 , DB, 2019 , ASFA, 2019 , we could not find out what algorithms or theory they rely on. 21 Research-wise, in mechanism design 22 , a related direction has been emerging that studies how to design the information structure [Taneva, 2015, Bergemann and Morris, 2017] instead of the allocation/payment structure. Furthermore, datadriven approaches to mechanism design have gained momentum [Balcan et al., 2016 , Duetting et al., 2019 , Tang, 2017 , Kearns et al., 2014 . But these lines of research differ from ours -often additionally to what we already mentioned in Section 1 (bounded rationality of our users and limited power of our mechanism) as follows: either they assume that agents input their (true, if "incentive compatible") preferences explicitly (instead of behavioral data), or they neglect, to some extent, agent's actual preferences (which can be appropriate for revenue maximization of course).
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied when and how parts of the coordination process of users of shared facilities can be "outsourced" to a central data-driven predictive assistant. Our theoretical analysis showed that such assistants can help solve the coordination problem in a gametheoretic sense, but non-trivial conditions have to be met: in terms of the information and preference structure of users, and stochasticity of their preferences in case only large-scale aggregated information is available to the assistant. Based on this analysis, we proposed two machine learning coordination assistant algorithms on behavioral data. We used linear dynamical systems models to prove their optimality/convergence, accounting for the fact that there is a feedback loop from predictions to outcomes. And we conducted a large-scale interventional experiment in a real campus cafeteria that provided empirical hints for the validity of our main algorithm.
Generally, the mentioned related work and our work indicate that there is a plethora of possible computational mechanisms for collective decision making, in terms of inputs (high-level information, behavioral data, and beyond) and influences (full control over the outcome, money incentives, pure information/predictions, and beyond), many of which may still be unexplored.
